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Abstract. The objective of tissue engineering is to create living body parts that will fully integrate with the
recipients body. With respect to the ethics of tissue engineering, one can roughly distinguish two
perspectives. On the one hand, this technology is considered morally good because tissue engineering is
copying nature. On the other hand, tissue engineering is considered morally dangerous because it deﬁes
nature: bodies constructed in the laboratory are seen as unnatural. In this article, we develop a
phenomenological-ethical perspective on bodies and technologies, in which the notion lived body and
concrete experiences of health and illness play an important role. From that perspective, we analyse the
practice of tissue engineering by focussing on one speciﬁc example: the engineering of heart valves. On the
basis of this analysis, we propose that the ethics of tissue engineering should be framed not in terms of
natural or unnatural but in terms of good embodied life and lived integrity.
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Introduction
We are working on human bodies. Thus, when
the medical doctor in Switzerland says Yes, but
those children...., then our PhD students think to
themselves The heart valves I am making will be
implanted in a child later (...). That is why PhD
students working on pressure ulcers are required
to visit at least one patient whose body has a
large cavity of this nature. It smells, the PhD
students conclude. Yes, I then say. This is what
you are working on.
(Senior researcher 3, October 2003,
translated from Dutch)
There is a heartbeat in the cell laboratory. Biore-
actors, incubators and the laboratory setting cause
any daily bodily life to seem distant. But the
rhythm of the air pump that mimics a body-like
ﬂow of medium through the tissue engineered heart
valve is familiar, and the researchers joke that
perhaps if they stand there long enough their own
heartbeats will synchronise with the mechanical
beat. The professor agrees. However, for those
equipped with a stethoscope, a valve engineered
here will one day soon be audible in the chest of a
young child. Will it continue to beat and to adjust
to the body, or will it wear out? Will the child live
or die? These are questions that tissue engineers
ask themselves in the face of a clinical trial. The
above quote indicates how the notion of tissue
engineering (TE) changes when engineers link their
work to bodies and especially to patients being these
bodies. In the work of Merleau-Ponty, the latter
distinction is central. Bodies in daily life are not
simply collections of nerves, muscles and tissue;
rather, people are their bodies and live their bodies
as their abilities and directedness to the world: this
is expressed by the term embodiment (Merleau-
Ponty, 2002). In this article, we explore relations
between embodiment and laboratory work in TE.
In particular, we show how a phenomenological
perspective helps to understand how intervening
with our material bodies implies aﬀecting our
embodiment.
The focus on TE is of interest, as this area is
seldom explored in philosophy and ethics.
1 In
public accounts of TE, the diﬀerences between it
and more traditional body-technology relations
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valve are often pointed out. In expressions like
mimicking nature it is suggested that because TE
involves amending ﬂeshy beings through amending
ﬂesh, it remains closer to what we understand as
our natural bodies than do bionic technologies.
Accordingly, TE is often considered to be a
morally innocent technology (Kent et al., 2006,
p. 14). However, in accusations of playing God or
of creating Frankensteins, it is suggested that TE
transforms our bodies in a much more radical way
than do bionic technologies. This is because rather
than simply adding something to our bodies, TE
intervenes with our ﬂeshy existence (Thacker,
2002). From this perspective, TE seems to be a
dangerous technology. Instead of stressing the
diﬀerences between bionic technologies and TE,
and making either type of technology more inno-
cent or more dangerous, a phenomenological
analysis demonstrates that TE is not special, and
can be analysed in terms similar to those used in
other technologies. We will make clear that it is a
pitfall to discuss TE in terms of it being more or
less right a priori because of its ﬂeshy nature.
To develop a phenomenological-ethical perspec-
tive on TE, we need to understand what TE entails.
To that end we studied the relevant literature and
performed ethnographic research (Hammersley
and Atkinson, 1995) in a broad sense. One of us
travelled to Boston, where most TE research
originated, and visited the laboratories of leading
researchers, who were interviewed. Moreover, since
2003 we have closely followed one speciﬁc project,
a Dutch-Swiss Heart Valve Project, a collaboration
between a Swiss research group based in a hospital
and a biomedical technology group located at a
Dutch technological university. This project has as
its objective the creation of a fully autologous
aortic heart valve. This means that patients cells
are used and that ideally the ﬁnal implants will
contain no foreign materials. One of us attended
internal meetings, visited the laboratory, had
informal contacts with researchers and conducted
taped interviews with the investigators involved
and with thoracic surgeons. In this article, we will
use this ethnographic material to develop a
phenomenological-ethical perspective on body-
technology relations in TE. Although the focus is
on TE, we think that this perspective is fruitful to
study other biomedical technologies as well.
First, we develop a normative framework for
analysing biomedical technologies and in particu-
lar TE. We refer to the insights of Merleau-Ponty,
Don Idhe, Francesco Varela and Jean-Luc Nancy
to explore the meaning and relevance of the notion
of transparency for embodiment. We then consider
two alternative frameworks of good embodied life
that might be used to evaluate body technologies:
Frederik Svenaeus analysis of lived health as a
balance between transparency of the body and a
directedness to the body and Gail Weiss concept
of multiple bodily experiences. We conclude that
notions of good embodied life should go beyond
mere transparency of the body, for that notion
implies that awareness of the physiological body as
in illness is evaluated negatively. We will argue for
a notion of lived integrity that does justice to
experiences of being this hurting or changing body,
which are often central during illness. Lived
integrity refers to the achievement of living illness,
body change and technological additions as one-
self. In the light of this perspective, we analyse in
what sense biomedical technologies enhance or
threaten lived integrity.
Second, we make use of this phenomenological
perspective to open up the ﬁeld of TE to a
normative analysis in terms of lived bodies. We
ﬁrst show how ideas about what a normal body is
play an important role in the practice of TE. TE is
presented as making body parts that are more
natural and therefore better than other prostheses.
We then analyse how in the practice of TE the
normal body is closely linked to the notion of
transparency. For this we make use of interviews
with surgeons who are able to link problems of
prosthetic heart valves in physical bodies to the
lived experiences of their patients. The phenome-
nological perspective as developed in the ﬁrst
paragraphs leads us to argue for a broader concept
of normal bodies and embodiment in TE. We
suggest that once the simple logic that engineering
natural body parts leads automatically to good
life has been taken apart, the introduced perspec-
tive can be used to study all kinds of tissue
engineered body parts as well as different kinds of
lived experiences.
In our conclusion, we argue that biomedical
technologies like TE may both improve and
threaten good embodied life and that these
technologies therefore need to be discussed and
evaluated in phenomenological terms: namely,
embodiment. But let us start with a phenomeno-
logical perspective on body-technology relations.
Embodiment as transparency
To build our framework of lived bodies, we start
with some important insights of Merleau-Ponty.
He showed how we experience our physical bodies
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through our bodies and how technologies can be
like body parts in body-world experiences.
Merleau-Ponty analysed what he called being-
in-the-world, and observed that as a human being
a person is not a consciousness in a body or
having a body; rather, he/she lives his/her body
as being-in-the-world. Throughout his work,
Merleau-Ponty illustrates that we live our bodies
through the world, and we live the world through
our bodies. One clear example is body size. Even
though a man might be of average height, he could
experience his body as huge upon entering a tiny –
at least in his bodily experience – campsite toilet.
However, just a few moments later he might feel
small when looking up into the endless sky. How
we live our bodies is thus not in any deﬁnite sense
determined by our physical make-up. Our physical
body is what makes being-in-the-world possible,
while we live our bodies as potentialities rather
than as collections of tissue (Merleau-Ponty, 2002,
p. 126). In daily life we experience our hands not as
skin, bones and nerves, but as being able to catch a
ball, do the dishes or stroke the dog. In fact, we can
do all these things because we are our body.
Being-in-the-world also involves being part of
the world without collapsing into it. One of
Merleau-Pontys examples is that of a persons left
hand touching his or her own right hand. The
toucher is part of the tactile world, but there is a
shift between touching and being touched
(Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 130–155). Clearly our
own bodies are part of the world but are also our
centre of experience. It is from this picture that
Merleau-Ponty also develops a notion of intersub-
jectivity: we recognise other bodies as centres of
lived experience.
Our physical body is what makes being-in-the-
world possible, and technologies may become part
of our being-in-the world. However, because we do
so habitually we often do not pay explicit attention
to how we as bodies interact with technology.
Consider a Dutch example: Dutch people learn
early in life to ride bicycles. When they cycle to
work or to the shops they do so without explicitly
being aware of how they are using their body. They
can cycle without holding the handlebar and at the
same time unbutton their jacket. The bicycle is, as
it were, part of their being-in-the-world at that
moment. Compare this to the experience of skiing
for the ﬁrst time. Dutch people are then very much
aware both of the skis moving in undesired
directions and of their body. It hurts to fall, even
in snow, and their muscles, not being used to these
movements, make their presence clearly felt.
Moreover, one needs to think simultaneously
about the position of arms and legs and how to
avoid trees. However, after a time the skis become
part of the albeit clumsy ability to move on snow.
The skis, says Merleau-Ponty, have stopped being
objects and have become a potentiality of the
skier. Often when people remove their skis they
ﬁnd themselves sinking into about a metre of snow
because they had forgotten that they cannot walk
on it without skis.
Merleau-Ponty points out that technologies
become like body parts and not the other way
around (Merleau-Ponty, 2002, pp. 165–169). A
foot is not like a ski one can take oﬀ: rather, the ski
becomes like a foot, part of the skiers way of
experiencing and relating to the world. In an era
where we can add to and take away parts of the
body, one may wonder what to think of this
observation. Is the experience of a broken tool
diﬀerent from that of a broken hand or even a
malfunctioning internal organ? And if so, how? To
deal with this question, we compare Ihdes work on
the embodiment of technologies with that of
Varelo and Nancy on living through the experience
of an organ transplantation.
Illness as loss of transparency
Ihde took up Merleau-Pontys analysis of embodi-
ment and considered in particular how bodily
materiality and technologies interact (Ihde, 1990,
2002). Many of Ihdes examples concern scientiﬁc
visualisation instruments, and his analysis shows
that both the human and the world are trans-
formed by technology-mediated interactions. For
example, consider a woman putting her glasses
on: her own body, her eyeglasses and her imme-
diate environment alter. Her vision changes from
being vague to clear, the glasses become part of
what she can do (see) and the world gains in
important detail. However, the manner in which
technology and the body change depends on to
what extent a technology becomes part of the
body; in that context, Ihde introduces the concept
of transparency. In Ihdes analysis of embodiment
of technologies, the objectness of a technology is
considered a lack of transparency and therefore a
negative feature. If the womans glasses are dirty
she needs to clean them, in which case they are
objects to her rather than parts of her embodi-
ment. If the object is transparent to someone,
he or she does not notice it and it is simply part
of his or her being-in-the-world.
2 Thus, Ihdes
description of embodiment assumes that our normal
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to the world rather than to experiences of our
body.
The work of Ihde and Merleau-Ponty raises the
question of how to interpret experiences of illness.
Merleau-Ponty noted that technologies are like
body parts in embodiment relations. However,
what about the other way around? Are broken
body parts also like broken tools? In Ihdes
analysis, transparency is broken if the tool is no
longer lived as part of a persons relation to the
world. Attention is then shifted to the tool as
object and away from the activity in which this
person-tool was involved. To some extent, a loss of
transparency of our own ﬂeshy body parts is
experienced in a similar manner: we turn away
from the world and actively relate to the diseased
body part. When we are ill, the awareness of pain
and the loss of control over body parts and so on
are part of this. In illness we are often directed to
the body instead of to the world. Following Ihdes
ideas, the awareness of the physical body during
illness should be considered a loss of transparency.
But in what sense should we speak of loss of
transparency during illness?
In the work of Varela and Nancy, loss of
transparency is an important aspect of being ill.
These two philosophers lived through a liver and
heart transplantation, respectively, and made a
phenomenological analysis of their experience
(Nancy, 2002; Varela, 2001). Nancy and Valera
describe how their own heart and liver, respec-
tively, become like a stranger when doctors point
these organs out as being diseased and in need of
attention. The organs are no longer part of the
persons directedness to the world, because now the
organs are actively related to, perhaps most clearly
when they are visualised on computer screens.
Nancy remarks that only when his body began to
disintegrate did the identiﬁcation of this heart as
mine and of an I with this body arise (Nancy,
2002). In Varelas case, the experience of bodily
contingency and fragility is also striking. He
describes:
It so happens that the Graft Centre is located not
a block away from my apartment in Paris. Dur-
ing the interminable wait, I used to take walks in
front of it, and ponder the almost tangible con-
tingency of my life (if I survived) within this
arrangement (...). After months I was requested
to carry on me at all times a dedicated portable
phone, and to never be far from the hospital (...).
Weeks without end; every minute the pressure of
my portable phone as witness awakening me
to the immense fragility of my life and the
tenousness of my identity in this tangle of
deferred causalities.
(Varela, 2001, pp. 266–267)
Both Nancy and Varela describe how their expe-
rience of loss of transparency is historically and
socially situated. Striking is how awareness of
technological development affects Nancys experi-
ence of organ transplants. He characterises the
crossing of his personal history and the history of
technology as I being cached in the possibilities of
technology: 20 years earlier he would not have
lived; 20 years later there might be other possibil-
ities. But he lives here and now with this trans-
planted heart (Nancy, 2002). Varela analyses how
he lives the social imagery of the gift that is present
in the conceptualisation of donating organs.
In the early temporality of the experience, I said,
the social imaginary link is intense and gripping.
And the longing to find the source of this don of
life is clearly present; it feels as ancestral and
ancient as the compulsion to bury our dead; it
surges forth from roots too old to be conscious.
(Varela, 2001, p. 267)
We learn from the work of Varela and Nancy that,
whenoneisseverelyill,lossoftransparencyinvolves
two connected experiences. First, one experiences
thediseasedorganbothanobjectandaspartofself.
It stands out simultaneously both as more separate
and as a crucial part of being-in-the-world. In
addition, the donor organ is experienced both as
this organ that I have received and as part of the
persons being-in-the-world. Second, illness implies
being confronted with the frailty of ones body and
the contingency of ones life, in the light of being an
organism and of technological developments.
With Varela and Nancy, we have now shown
that a loss of transparency can indeed be consid-
ered a part of illness. Their work, however,
provides an account of an extraordinary experience
of illness: that of an organ transplantation. More
ordinary experiences of illness do not seem to
involve such an extreme focus on the body or such
a feeling of being overwhelmed by contingency.
When we have a minor headache there is some loss
of transparency, though we can still also be world-
centred, albeit in a slightly less focussed way.
Moreover, even when we do not feel ill we are
confronted with our physiological bodies through-
out the day: for example, when we need to go to
the toilet. Full transparency of the physiological
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embodied life. This raises two questions: What is
the role of transparency in lived health? and more
generally, To what extent does a tool-like ap-
proach to the body capture possible good embod-
ied experiences?
In the next two sections, we show how alterna-
tive answers by Svenaeus and Weiss to these
questions lead to different notions of good embod-
ied life.
llness as an alienated way of being-in-the-world
In his analysis of lived health and illness, Svenaeus
addresses the balance between being-my-body and
awareness of the physiological body as having a life
of its own. Like Ihde, Svenaeus builds on Heideg-
gers work on the broken tool. It is when the tool
breaks down that it becomes an object of attention.
While Idhe uses the notion of transparency to
differentiate between body-technology relations,
Svenaeus relates a loss of transparency to a loss of
meaning. According to Svenaeus, it is this loss of
meaning that makes a loss of transparency a
negative experience.
Svenaeus builds his account of health on how
tools form patterns of meaning in our lives. The
tool is not a mere thing, but an in order to.
Consider Heideggers famous example of a ham-
mer. Only by using it (e.g. to build a roof on our
house) do we learn what it is ([Heidegger, 1927] in
(Svenaeus, 2000, p. 127)). By merely looking at its
shape, colour and so on we do not learn what
makes it a tool. Thus, we encounter the world not
as a collection of mere things but as a collection of
tools: an intersubjective and lived meaning struc-
ture (Svenaeus, 2000, p. 126). Svenaeus points out
that the lived body can be understood as a tool or
part of this meaning structure. Here he also refers
to Merleau-Ponty, who said the body understands
and inhabits the world (Svenaeus, 2000, p. 127).
According to Svenaeus, the world is homelike
insofar as it is understandable and composed of
human actions.
Svenaeus builds on Heideggers analysis of the
world as pervaded by homelessness. We experi-
ence a sense of homelessness insofar as we have no
full knowledge or control of the world. It is
experienced both as being my world and as other
in the sense of being beyond my control (Svenaeus,
2000, p. 125). Svenaeus places the social situated-
ness of embodiment in this context: meaning
structures are socially situated and in this sense
are part of the otherness of the world (Svenaeus,
2001, p. 94). According to Svenaeus, bodily illness
is a speciﬁc experience of otherness: namely, the
otherness of this body. In other words, it involves
experiencing biological processes that are beyond
our control but that are also part of being-a-body.
Therefore, we touch here on what Varela and
Nancy describe as living the disintegration of their
bodies: the strangeness of the diseased organs,
which, nevertheless, are a part of themselves.
In Svenaeus work, the breaking down of the
body is an example of what may constitute illness.
He gives a wide range of examples, such as having
a cold and having a stroke. In illness, the body and
the world are experienced as alienated, and we
cannot live our usual manner of being-in-the-
world. Though in health we are also aware of our
bodies as organisms, for we have to eat, urinate,
sweat and so on, in illness this conscious presence
becomes stronger. An example is an elderly man
who is incontinent and can no longer trust his body
to warn him that he needs to urinate. Hence, he has
to pay particular heed to it. In this regard, two
central themes arise in Svenaeus analysis: illness as
a disturbance of our usual balanced way of both
attending to and living our bodies directed towards
the world, and as the resulting experience of
alienation of our bodies and worlds. In illness,
our usual balance is disturbed and we have to make
a greater effort: for example, a woman may have a
terrible cold and be unable to read comfortably in
bed as she normally likes to do. Her morning
coffee makes her nauseous, and the normally
welcome voices of her children drive her back to
bed. Today she cannot live her usual self and relate
to the world and to others in her customary way.
3
In health, we are, as it were, at home in our world,
whereas in illness the otherness – that which is out
of control – of world and body confronts us. Our
ordinary understanding of the world and our
ordinary activities break down. Svenaeus compares
it to keeping ones balance while cycling. Balancing
is normally an active process but it takes place
automatically; in illness, the balancing does not
function as usual. Illness disturbs important aspects
of our being-in-the-world, which go beyond the
mere physical aspects: a person does not just have a
headache, he is also an inattentive friend today,
because he needs to be alone with his headache.
Note that there is not necessarily one balance:
chronic disease does not have to mean chronic
illness in ones activities. Svenaeus suggests that
illness may also lead to new understandings of our
wordliness.
Problems with our physiological body are not
the only factors that can lead to sickness. The
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structures in life may also constitute illness.
Svenaeus illustrates that a difference between tools
and body parts should be drawn phenomenolog-
ically, rather than with reference to the body as an
organic whole (Svenaeus, 2001, p. 98). Body parts
diﬀer from tools in general, for they are more
central to a persons being-in-the-world. The bro-
ken hammer may be annoying but it is quite
diﬀerent from a broken hand that pervades some-
ones being-in-the-world. However, in Svenaeus
work, transparency is not merely an aspect of
living ones body or of body-technology relations.
He gives the loss of a loved one as an example of
what may lead to illness in the sense of a
breakdown of our meaning structures. The expe-
rience of illness as the loss of our homelike being-in
the-world can, according to Svenaeus, also be
related to a loss of important tools. For example,
the loss of a hearing-aid, glasses or a wheelchair
that is not easily replaced can also make the
experience of being-in-the-world unhomelike. Sim-
ilarly, the loss of an appendix does not have to
mean living through illness. Svenaeus points out
that what constitutes illness depends upon how
important a tool, whether technological or body
part, is for a persons homelike being-in-the-world.
In other words, embodied technologies that are a
central part of ones being-in-the-world could be
understood as phenomenological body parts.
We wish to add that the experience of health,
illness or disability does not just depend upon ones
body in a phenomenological sense but also upon
the world one lives in. The physical arrangement of
ones world inﬂuences a persons being-in-the-
world. Consider someone who is well accustomed
to using a wheelchair. This person has embodied
the wheelchair and moves around with an ease
similar to that with which we use our legs.
However, when moving outside of spaces such as
hospitals the wheelchair user will be continually
confronted with a world built for upright people.
As Kay Toombs explains in her analysis of the
experience of multiple sclerosis, embodying a
wheelchair in an upright world implies needing
assistance: for example, when using phone booths.
She also found that toilets on airplanes were too
small and she needed to leave the toilet door open
(Toombs, 2001, pp. 253–255). An everyday Dutch
example of the experience of elderly bodies and
how our immediate furniture aﬀects our being-in-
the-world is the proposal to distribute more
benches throughout neighbourhoods. For many
elderly walkers, the distance between benches is
currently too great. The placement of extra
benches would transform these people into able
walkers. This observation reminds us that to
improve the experience of bodies as I can, one
can also address the environment as well as change
the body.
According to Svenaeus, the objective of health
care should be to restore the patients homelike
being-in-the-world. And with his notion of balanc-
ing, Svenaeus analysis captures our embodiment
well: in daily life we live our bodies directed to the
world but we also attend to our bodies. Neverthe-
less, Svenaeus account raises a question, as he
presumes that encountering ones body as a bio-
logical process is alienating. But is this necessarily
so? What about the enjoyment of sexual experi-
ences, lactation, pregnancy and even urinating? In
this light, we therefore look below at the work of
Weiss for an alternative concept of good embodied
life, which takes such experiences speciﬁcally into
account.
Multiplicity and change as lived bodily integrity
In the work of Weiss, embodiment is characterised
by intercorporeality, a notion that is in striking
contrast to the dualism of Svenaeus mineness/
othernessoftheworldandbody.Weissworkswithin
a tradition of feminist philosophers, especially Iris
Young, who have stressed that we experience our
bodies as invested with meaning, images and ideals.
In the work of Merleau-Ponty, we do ﬁnd a
description of being situated in historical contexts,
but this is not worked out in terms of embodiment.
In reaction to Merleau-Ponty, Young gives exam-
ples of female embodiment: namely, how girls learn
to move in a gender-speciﬁc manner by throwing,
walking and sitting as girls. Young females thus
learn a feminine embodiment style. Building also on
Young and Merleau-Ponty, Weiss book Body
Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality shows
how we live through body images that are infused
with those of race, gender and technology (Weiss,
1999). The notion of intercorporeality is introduced
by Weiss to stress that embodiment is mediated by
other bodies – human and nonhuman – and thus is
not a private issue; being-in-the-world is being part
of situated material, social, political and ethical
worlds.
4
Both Young and Weiss point out that we also
live our bodies in relation to body ideals that we
learn or develop throughout life. They show that
seemingly neutral analyses of embodiment often
idealise the body as I can, directed outwards to
the world. For example, central in Merleau-Pontys
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capabilities. According to Young and to Weiss, this
is only one way to live bodies, and it is idealised
over other ways. This focus on I can is also
present in the work of Svenaeus, who calls illness
an obstruction to health and its transparency,
explaining that everything that goes on without us
paying explicit attention to it when we are healthy
– walking, thinking, talking – now offers resistance
(Svenaeus, 2001, pp. 89–90).
5 Young gives a much
richer picture of living a female body: having fun
dressing up; the messiness of pregnancy, where
body boundaries are changing all the time; and
living ones breasts in a society with speciﬁc breast
ideals. Central to all these experiences is the
awareness of being-a-body, and sometimes enjoy-
ing this as well. It is an awareness that cannot be
reduced to I can, or to tool-like relations. More-
over, Young points out the way these cultural ideas
may inﬂuence embodiment negatively. She notes
that in the dominant conception of health a change
in bodily condition is considered a disruption or
malfunction. Thus, something is the matter when
bodily transparency breaks down. Weiss agrees
with Youngs critique on this ideal of bodily health.
Moreover, she states that it is possible to live
bodily changes as an experience of integrity. In
other words, awareness of bodily change is not
necessarily alienating.
Weiss stresses that we may experience multi-
plicity of body experiences as changes in our
embodiment, thus bringing them together in a
sense of integrity. We all have continuously chang-
ing embodiments, simply because our being-in-the-
world ﬂuctuates all the time. In the morning we
cycle easily to work, feeling strong and ﬁt. In the
afternoon we are sometimes so tired that the trip
home seems endless. Or the wind is blowing us
almost off our bicycles, and we feel weakened. A
denial of multiplicity and change is a danger to
bodily integrity, for these changes happen anyway.
One example Weiss gives is that there is a tendency
to deny that pregnant existence may also be sexual
existence, and in that matter to deny women the
possibility to live their sexual and pregnant exis-
tence in a sense of integrity. Her notion of
multiplicity also makes it easier to discuss new
medical technologies affecting embodiment with-
out seeing this as a necessary threat to other bodily
experiences. For example, she does not agree with
feminist critique that ultrasound necessarily inter-
venes negatively with pregnant embodiment
(Weiss, 1999, pp. 124–125). Instead, it adds a
dimension to the multiplicity of pregnant embodi-
ment as long as other experiences are not denied.
Weiss description of living with multiplicity is
not dissimilar to Svenaeus concept of balancing.
Both describe active processes in which a persons
constantly ﬂuctuating being-in-the-world is lived
with a sense of being his or her body and living in
his or her world (integrity or homelikeness).
However, though Svenaeus description is not
static, it very much emphasises familiarity and
rhythm, and it links the breakdown of these to
illness. In Weiss analysis, continual change receives
much more attention, and she studies bodily
focussed ways of being-in-the-world. Weiss shows
that we need multiplicity in our body images to live
in a non-pathological way what she calls the
turbulence of our bodily existence or our bodily
ﬂuidity. The ideal of health, which emphasises
transparency, involves only one dimension of lived
bodies and is thus a danger to health in terms of
integrity. Does this mean that Svenaeus account
has fallen prone to this ideal? We would say yes
and no.
With yes, there is the suggestion that more
than customary attention to our body as an
organism with a life of its own is necessarily
alienating. One central aspect here is the idea that
things need to be in ones control. But sometimes
the experience of being bedridden with a high fever
can be comforting rather than alienating. The
letting go of daily worries and the more or less
forced relaxation might be a relief. Even a feverish
body might be experienced as ones own. Perhaps
for those who mainly live as I think or I can, the
experience might be alienating. Whereas those
accustomed to live I breath, hurt, run, stumble,
urinate, give birth, and are dependent upon tech-
nologies like hearing aids, glasses, wheelchairs,
noisy heart valves or stomas, may live their
physical bodies as self rather than other. Societal
norms play an important role here as well; if bodily
noises and smells, or tools such as hearing aids, are
a reason for shame, these may be alienating if
indeed experienced as otherness rather than mine-
ness, whereas in other situations this need not be
the case.
6
With no, while we can argue that Svenaeus
does stress the importance of bodily stability, we
can also argue that this is an artefact of the speciﬁc
examples in his work. We therefore suggest that
Weiss and Svenaeus analyse different experiences
of different bodies. Because Svenaeus analyses
living, stable bodies, whereas Weiss analyses exam-
ples like pregnant experiences, they are bound to
come up with different phenomenologies. Of
course, one may critique the choice of analysed
experiences. Moreover, situated experience also
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bodily change and body images infused with
ﬂuidity can be confronted with the need to learn
to live this speciﬁc body in a meaningful manner.
Each new disease may constitute speciﬁc experi-
ences and challenges. And perhaps the experience
of existential anxiety points to limits in the
experience of integrity. It can be confronting to
realise that being ﬂesh and blood means being
ﬁnite and frail. Finally, note that there is a risk of
idealising ﬂuidity as well: though learning to live
with bodily malfunction is sometimes a solution, it
should not be idealised as the solution. However,
Weiss account is not particularly susceptible to
this, for she pays considerable attention to how
body technologies are a part of our being-in-the-
world.
Let us now answer the question as to what is a
good objective for health care in terms of good
embodied life. Clearly, transparency is a worth-
while objective, as being meaningfully active in the
world is an important aspect of life. Alienation is
something to avoid or to overcome. Here the
accounts of Weiss and Svenaeus suggest different
approaches. According to Svenaeus, experiencing
ones body as an organism is uncanny and is an
experience of being out of control. Svenaeus also
holds that as one lives through the bodys processes
one feels necessarily alienated. In this line of
thought, seeking transparency – a new balance –
is the only way to overcome alienation and
therefore illness. We agree with Weiss that alien-
ation is not necessary when we strive for lived
integrity instead of lived health. This means that
we should not strive for wholeness and closure, but
seek lived expansiveness, ﬂuidity and multiplicity:
namely, learn to accept being this body in all its
conﬂicting ways of existence.
It becomes clear from our analysis that lived
integrity is an important additional ethical concept
to evaluate new biomedical technologies and health
care practices. Lived integrity can, for example,
coincide with improving bodily capabilities, as the
use of technology is not alienating when there is the
possibility to experience multiplicity. This means
that lived integrity does not replace objectives like
diminished pain or improved hearing, but asks for
doing it in such a way that this can be lived as a
transition rather than a restoration to a normal
state. In other words, in health care, illness should
not simply be something to overcome but also be
treated as a meaningful part of life. The impor-
tance of lived integrity as an objective is that
contingency and vulnerability become less over-
whelming and uncanny.
Now that we have developed our phenomeno-
logical-ethical perspective, we will apply it to the
practice of TE as we studied it and to the prevailing
goal of TE to bring about ideal bodies by
mimicking nature. How does this ideal relate to
the notion of lived integrity?
Mimicking nature versus unnatural prostheses?
In its practice, TE is sometimes presented as to
help bodies heal themselves (Williams, 2003). By
emphasising how in autologous TE the patients
own cells are used, ethical questions and concerns
about this relatively new practice are evaded
(Faulkner et al., 2006). Human organs do not
grow by themselves in petridishes: they need to be
engineered and designed. Unique to TE is the
making of ﬂeshy body parts by using cells to
engineer living materials. The studied heart valve
project is an example of autologous TE, in which
the researchers assume that a patients cells will be
used to engineer the tissue in the laboratory, which
will be transported back to the patients body. TE
walks a ﬁne line with regard to what people
perceive as natural and what they do not, and
researchers fear being accused of engineering a
Frankenstein or of playing God (Patrick et al.,
1998, p. 331). Even for tissue engineers themselves
it is controversial and frightening to speak about
the design of living body parts; hence, tissue
engineers tend to present TE in terms of mimicking
nature or of helping the body to heal itself.
Consider the reaction of one engineer whom we
asked about the design of human body parts:
Im frequently asked by the press and the media,
Dont you think youre playing God? How do
you dare? Yet I have absolutely no sense of
doing that. Because what we do is this: we use
autologous cells, we dont change them. There is
no genetic impact, because we use them like in an
ex-vivo wound healing. We take something that is
there as a capacity and help it happen outside of
the body.
(Senior researcher 1, October 2004)
The tissue engineer in question seems to claim that
TE is not about changing bodies and is therefore
all right in a normative sense. With the notion of
mimicking nature, he stresses that he adheres to the
norms of nature. There is no genetic impact
means that no interventions are carried out that are
essential in a normative sense. Thus, while the
technology presents an engineering approach to
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questions one might have about genetic engineer-
ing. Another engineer explained that the ideal was
not to make natural tissue, but native tissue
(senior researcher 3, informal talk, NL, October
2006). This formulation suggests that the engi-
neered tissue was in some sense already part of the
body. In Dutch, native is translated as lichaamse-
igen, which loosely means the bodys own. This
comes closest to what the researcher means: to
engineer tissue that the body takes up as if it were
tissue generated by the body itself.
In line with the presentation of TE as mimick-
ing nature, the need for TE valves is claimed by
pointing out that problems with existing heart
valve prostheses arise in the interaction between
the body and an implanted prosthetic unnatural
or dead valve. In one PhD thesis, in a section
titled The ideal heart valve substitute, the need for
the tissue engineering of heart valves is, for
instance, identiﬁed by referring to the drawbacks
of the state-of-the-art valves that are used yearly in
60,000 valve replacements in the United States
(Hoerstrup, 2005). Consider how the author dis-
cusses problems with mechanical heart valves in
terms of foreign materials:
The major drawback of mechanical valves relates
to the fact that these prostheses represent foreign
materials, associated with the risk of infections
and thromboembolic complications. To prevent
thromboelism, a life-long anticoagulation therapy
is required (e.g. warfarin), showing a substantial
risk of haemorrhagic or thromboembolic inci-
dences (...). Apart from this, additional problems
may occur, e.g., in young fertile females because of
embryo toxicity of warafin and related substances.
(Hoerstrup, 2005, pp. 2–3)
In plain English, we may say that mechanical
valves offer a lifetime solution, but with the
drawback of an ongoing need for anticoagulation,
which is necessary to prevent the blood from
clotting on the artiﬁcial material. However, this
clotting sometimes happens anyway. Anticoagula-
tion itself entails a risk of bleeding complications
that can be minor as well as fatal.
In the forementioned thesis, problemsassociated
with biological valves – either donor valves or those
madefrombovine(cow)pericardiumorpigvalves–
are summarised in terms of their low durability:
The majority of biological valve prostheses are
either glutaraldehyde fixed xenografts (derived
from animals) or cryopreserved homografts (derived
from human donors) (...). [These valves] do not
require anticoagulation medication, however, they
represent non-viable prostheses suffering from
structural dysfunction due to progressive tissue
deterioration (...). The majority of biological
valves, therefore, necessitates re-replacement with-
in 10–15 years, and because of higher immuno-
logical competence their durability is even less in
younger individuals.
(Hoerstrup, 2005, p. 3)
These valves are always processed and contain no
living tissue: therefore, they wear out and have a
durability of about 12 years. In young patients the
time is less, due to calciﬁcation. This is a major
issue because heart valve operations are major
surgical interventions that require open heart
surgery with the use of a heart-lung machine.
Patients require intensive care treatment and need
considerable time to recover. Moreover, each
operation carries with it a risk of complications.
Each one of which has a small but measurable
risk. And you know, we have had patients who
have not survived these conduit changes and
things. So if you would have a better way of
approaching this then clearly there would be a
number of patients, a large number of patients
who would benefit.
(Cardiothoracic surgeon 3, Boston, June 2006)
This is an issue especially for small children, as
neither mechanical nor biological valves grow.
There are still patients who we are operating on
three or four times between the time they are in-
fants and the time they grow to adults. There
clearly is a need, and we dont have anything on
the horizon or currently available that would
meet that need to avoid these children having
these repeated operations.
(Cardiothoracic surgeon 3, Boston, June 2006)
For tissue engineers, the problems associated with
state-of-the-art substitutes are straightforward.
All clinically available valve prostheses basically rep-
resent non-viable structures and lack the ability to
grow, to repair or to remodel. This imposes severe
problems specifically on paedriatric patients.
(Hoerstrup, 2005, p. 3)
Tissue engineers consider the non-viability of the
state-of-the-art prostheses a central issue, and
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respect, a paper of Harken, in which a list is
presented as the Ten commandments of an ideal
heart valve, is often referred to.
The essential characteristics of ideal heart valve
substitutes have been described already in the
1950 by Dwight E. Harken, a pioneer in heart
valve surgery, and summarised as the so-called
‘‘Ten Commandments’’ (Harken 1989). These in-
clude durability, absence of thrombogenicity,
resistance to infections, lack of antigenicity, and
the potential of growth. In principle, he stated the
fundamental properties of natural, living, autolo-
gous tissues. Unfortunately, these requirements
are still not met by todays heart valve protheses.
(Hoerstrup, 2005, p. 3)
On the basis of problems with current heart valves,
the author of the previously mentioned thesis thus
argues that the natural valve is a logical objective
or ideal implant.
These examples show that in the reasoning of
tissue engineers unnatural valves become associ-
ated with problems, while natural valves are
idealised. Clearly, when engineers speak of natural
valves they do not mean that any natural valve will
do as an ideal example, nor do they refer to the
patients original malfunctional valves. Natural is
thus an abstract ideal that means at least living
and that patients own cells are used and are
functioning, growing and self-repairing. But what
kind of embodiment does this ideal imply? And
how does this compare to living with a biological
or mechanical prosthesis?
Tissue engineering: transparency as objective
In terms of the phenomenological perspective on
the body that we introduced, the TE practice
develops an ideal of a heart valve that implies a
desired transparency. Thoracic surgeons in partic-
ular express this ideal by explaining what the
problems with biological and mechanical valves
may mean in daily life. One surgeon, for instance,
points to the importance of a certain lifestyle when
evaluating the value of a speciﬁc kind of valve.
Are there special patient groups for whom you
prefer specific types of heart valves? For example,
for women who want to become pregnant?
Yes, for women who want to become pregnant. Or
people who want to do sports. Well, if people do
not fear a second operation, then as far as I am
concerned they may receive a bioprosthesis. I am
very liberal about that. If I myself needed a prosthe-
sis I would always choose a biological prosthesis.
So that you do not have to worry about injuring
yourself?
Yes, exactly. For example, I am a fanatic horse-
rider. That means that I definitely could not use
any blood thinners, because if I tumbled... It is
not bad if you bump into something once a
while. But if you really fell off the horse three or
four times a year, then youd die.
(Cardiothoracic surgeon 1, NL May 2006,
translated from Dutch)
The surgeon emphasises that biological valves are
preferable if you want to move around freely. It is
for this reason that doctors say a persons lifestyle
matters in the choice of a particular type of heart
valve substitute. As well as the fact that anticoag-
ulation implies being careful, it also means taking
pills and having your blood checked weekly
(Cardiothoracic surgeons 1 and 2, NL May
2006). It is probable that patients with a mechan-
ical heart valve do not so much relate to this valve
– it is lived as transparent – but to medication:
taking the right pills, having blood checks and
being cautious. Mechanical valves draw attention
to the body as being frail and in need of ongoing
surveillance.
The surgeons also make clear that noisy
mechanical heart valves may attract attention to
themselves, and the patient as well as other people
may hear the valve opening and closing. It might
even be possible to know, for example, whether the
person is agitated. It is an intercorporeal experi-
ence, and how people will live with noisy heart
valves depends upon how they, together with
others, relate to the noise.
Some people are bothered by that [sound of
mechanical heart valves]. It is good to mention it.
There are people who know they really cant
stand the ticking of clocks: that noise can be real-
ly annoying. I believe 20–30% hear their mechan-
ical valves, and that 4–5% find it really
disturbing.
(Cardiothoracic surgeon 2, NL May 2006,
translated from Dutch)
The complaints, varied from difficulties with falling
asleep (12, 8.5%) to irritation (9, 6.4%) and
nervousness or fear (5, 3.5%). One patient needed
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he had to stop playing poker, because a faster tick-
ing of his valve would reveal his state of mind.
Some patients said they felt frightened by the con-
frontation with their own heart beating, while only
1 patient said he felt reassured by the valve sound.
(Laurens et al., 1992, p. 59)
There are even cases where the patient requested
explantation.
(Takkenberg, 2002)
For many patients, the noise recedes into the
background, becoming, as it were, transparent;
others, however, may be afraid of hearing some-
thing going wrong or may even be comforted by the
sounds. But there are many more situations to take
into account: for example, a partner who cannot
sleep and keeps on listening to make sure the person
with the heart valve is ﬁne. And what about
encountering new people who are not aware of
what a heart valve sounds like? A tissue engineered
valve is expected to be transparent also in the sense
that it is quiet. Moreover, as the different embod-
iments of noisy valves indicate, different people will
live similar technologies differently. Transparency
is not just an aspect of the technology but is
something that patients achieve as they become
used to and accept living with the noise.
Living with biological valves is quite different.
Though biological valves give some freedom for
short periods, the imminence of a new operation is
for adults and especially children never far away.
In some sense, people with a mechanical valve live
with minor breaks in transparency all the time, at
least if they go without complications. People with
a biological valve may live a relative transparency
for years, but are then confronted with surgery that
will have a major impact. But remember the
surgeon who said If people do not fear a second
operation, they may have a biological valve.I f
patients tend to worry, transparency can be dis-
rupted earlier.
When tissue engineers speak of the natural valve
as ideal, they suggest that natural body parts
imply transparency. For all valve types discussed,
the drawbacks were a matter of breaks in trans-
parency, albeit in different ways. Thus, translated
in terms of embodiment, the ideal valve is one that
it is expected to be fully transparent: it is unno-
ticeable, draws no attention to itself, either in the
form of medication, noise or complication, and in
general gives no reason to worry. However, the
link between transparency and natural in the
practice of TE is problematic in three ways.
First, it unjustly implies that unnatural biolog-
ical or mechanical valves are inevitably inferior
solutions. The objective of transparency does not
necessarily call for tissue engineered valves, as non-
living materials can also be lived as transparent.
Nor will TE be improving embodiment – in terms
of transparency – for large numbers of heart
patients in the short term. For though tissue
engineered valves might also be of use in the long
run for elderly patients, biological valves are
generally durable enough for them. The promises
of TE are not that relevant.
And if you look at TE and at tissue engineered
valves and at what you try to achieve, then you
focus on a very small group of children with a
congenital malformation. I think we have about
ten such children a year in the Netherlands. And
then for the pulmonary valve we have about 200
a year. Compare that to elderly people, of whom
about 5,000–6,000 a year need a valve prosthesis.
(Cardiothoracic surgeon 1, NL May 2006,
translated from Dutch)
For elderly people, possibilities like minimally
invasive surgery are much more relevant than TE.
Second, it is not yet clear that TE will indeed
constitute transparency. For younger patients, TE
may improve embodiment signiﬁcantly if it indeed
works as suggested, but can TE live up to its
promises? The practice may also show that the
promises are too optimistic, for despite current
hopes there might be a need for anticoagulation
therapy or for reoperations. And for some patients
the heart valve may be just one of the problems, or
the heart may be damaged irreversibly. Moreover,
though natural valves are seen as the golden
standard,thesearenotworkableobjectives.Knowl-
edge relating to heart valves is limited, and the
question of what is normal is not that easily
answered. Even if it can be agreed whose valves in
what sense are used as an example, the question
remains as to whether it is possible to engineer the
desired characteristics. The question of the strength
ofthetissueisoneexamplewherebodiesandinsome
regardalsoembodimentneedstobenegotiated.The
strength of the tissue is related to what pressure a
persons heart valve needs to withstand during
activities. Determining the minimal strength may
thus affect what people can do in their daily lives.
The discussion turns to the pressure to withstand.
Two pressures are at stake: normal pulsation
TISSUE ENGINEERING AND EMBODIMENT 279(5–10% stretch: elastic without deformation) and
high peaks: 20% strain if target is about
250 mmHg (which the talking senior researcher
takes to be a reasonable and realisable value; he
says that the literature names values up to
2,000 mmHg for people who for example run
uphill, but he thinks this is not realisable).
(from notes in English, scaffold meeting
January 2004)
It is not just this discussion that determines the
ﬁnal implant. However, as there is a lack of
regulation (Heinonen et al., 2005), researchers
have to discuss what is technologically feasible in
the short term in light of what they consider to be
good enough. The norms that are developed also in
collaboration with the FDA may aﬀect patient
capabilities, at least for the initial period after
implantation, and thus the patients capabilities
lived as I can or I cannot: for example, run uphill
or perhaps go through a vaginal delivery.
7
Thirdly, linking transparency to natural body
parts suggests that normal ﬂeshy embodiment is
transparent. In other words, in this way of speak-
ing about natural heart valves we recognise the
ideal of health that assumes that we mainly live our
body as I can. Both Young and Weiss indicated
that this ideal was also expressed in the work of
Merleau-Ponty, and they criticised it. They pointed
to the fact that these kinds of ideals might be a
hindrance to more bodily focussed ways of being in
the world, like enjoying dressing up or being
pregnant. In this light, we need to look at how
the ideal of mimicking nature that is present in the
engineering of natural heart valves may negatively
affect the embodiment of heart patients. Addition-
ally, we should examine how we can discuss
possible pros and cons of TE without speaking in
terms of natural/unnatural and without stimulat-
ing an ideal that limits embodiment.
Transparency as achievement
In the light of our framework, we concluded that
lived integrity should be an important additional
objective next to well-accepted objectives of health
care. In the case of heart valve patients, this means
that when we develop or use technologies – which,
one hopes, means that patients no longer need
anticlotting medication or multiple operations – we
also pay attention to stimulating living multiplicity
and change as being-this-body before, during and
after the technological intervention.
Especially for younger patients, it seems worth-
while that doctors work towards relative transpar-
ency,whileatthesametimeavoidingareinforcement
of the idea that this is what bodies naturally are.
Research on the lived experience of congenital heart
disease shows that patients long to be normal
(Claessens et al., 2005; McMurray et al., 2001).
For example, David, when asked about his ideal
wishes, describes his desire to be normal, not
worry, and have no further operations: Probably
to not have a heart condition – just to be nor-
mal... get rid of my scar and have no further
operations and just to be able to go and do any-
thing that I want without having to worry.
(Claessens et al., 2005, p. 5)
Again, we recognise the societal norm of health that
YoungandWeiss both commented oninthe longing
for transparency: the body that does not change or
disrupt you, that draws no attention to itself. Claes-
sens notes that, in general, surgery on patients born
with congenital heart disease improved lived experi-
ence, as it restores physical capabilities (Claessens
et al., 2005, p. 7). In other words, the body becomes
more an Ic a n . For young patients with valve
replacements, both mechanical and biological valves
make it, as explained, impossible to be normal.I f
what is promised regarding TE – no anticoagulation




up to normality, it would be unwise to reinforce this
body ideal by suggesting that TE would give them
normal, natural bodies. Presenting TE and in partic-
ular the ideal of transparency as natural undermines
otherordinaryexperiencesofourﬂeshybodies:living
a body also entails hurting, scarring oneself and
paying heed to ones bodily existence.
The challenge therefore is not to confuse objec-
tives of medical technologies with what constitutes
bodies. If the objective of TE is to add to the
experience of health, then transparency is, as
Svenaeus analysis makes clear, a valuable objec-
tive. However, Weiss analysis shows that we
should be clear that this transparency is engi-
neered, doctored and achieved rather than regen-
erated by natural bodies. One way to discuss TE
would then be as the following doctor-engineer
did. He contrasted the objective of TE with what
bodies can do by themselves:
So my view has always been to try to take the
best of nature but then be clever about changing
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(...). If she did, we would not have to do this. So
if somebody has trauma it heals with a scar, or
has an amputation or has a disease that kills an
organ, nature tries to repair it but doesnt get
very far. So we take advantage of nature and use
her but we also have to understand it can change
it to (...).
(Senior researcher 4, Boston, June 2006)
TE might therefore be presented as improving
bodies by making intelligent use of bodily pro-
cesses. In this way, patients may beneﬁt from
medical technologies, while the body ideals that are
materialised in these technologies are not that
easily mistaken as easy or obvious. Moreover,
staging TE as a body technology rather than self-
healing better captures how bodily transformations
through medical interventions are lived.
Now that the logic with regard to natural bodies
and good life has been deconstructed, we can use
and develop the introduced framework to study
other examples of tissue engineered body parts.
Here it would be useful to include patients
experiences in the analysis. Our preliminary anal-
ysis of tissue engineered heart valves shows how for
internal body parts a phenomenological perspec-
tive is illuminating, but the framework offers the
potential to study a wide range of aspects of
embodiment. An interesting project may involve
tissue engineered cartilage being used to treat knee
injuries. On the one hand, such cartilage may mean
that damage (e.g. from sports) could become
reversible. Will this affect the way people live their
bodies as vulnerable: namely, how will they man-
age their involvement in sports and their concern
for their body during activities? On the other hand,
there is evidence that TE will only work if the
surrounding tissue is quiet. This might mean that
treatment should be given when there are not yet
any symptoms. Will this affect how we conceive of
health and how we live health and illness? Another
interesting project involves tissue engineered blad-
ders, where living with incontinence, shame and
being in control may be topics to explore. Finally,
tissue engineered skin seems a particularly inter-
esting topic for studying aspects such as feeling
beautiful and the effects of ideals of beauty.
From ideal bodies to good embodied life
We introduced in this article a phenomenological-
ethical framework to reﬂect on biomedical technologies
from the perspective of embodiment. In developing
this framework we studied transparency as an
objective for health care. We highlighted that there
is a risk in idealising transparency as normal
embodiment and we introduced lived integrity as
a concept that characterises how being able to live
bodily focussed experiences, multiplicity and bod-
ily change as oneself is an important aspect of a
good embodied life. In this light, we showed that
while transparency is certainly a valuable objective
in health care, idealising transparency threatens
lived integrity and thereby may negatively affect
embodiment. We thus concluded that lived integ-
rity should be a central notion in phenomenolog-
ical-ethical reﬂections on the development,
introduction and use of biomedical technologies.
When we applied our phenomenological-ethical
framework to TE, it became clear that the tech-
nology may affect embodiment in two ways: ﬁrst,
clearly and signiﬁcantly, by amending patients
bodies in terms of cutting-and-pasting body parts.
The analysis of biological and mechanical heart
valves made clear how different kinds of body
prostheses constitute different ways of being-in-
the-world; second, by reinforcing body ideals like I
can, TE may negatively affect embodiment. In the
practice of TE, bodily problems are related to
mechanical or dead biological substitutes, and
transparency is coupled to natural body parts.
This kind of reasoning supposes that normal
embodiment is transparent and thereby makes it
hard to live bodily change and illness as self. In this
way, thinking in terms of mimicking nature
affects the possibility to achieve lived integrity.
Our analysis of TE points to a challenge for health
care in general: how to let people best beneﬁt from
biomedical technologies that may improve embodi-
ment, while not wanting to reinforce one-dimen-
sional body ideals like transparency.
To highlight the importance of multi-dimen-
sional body conceptions, let us give examples of
negative affects of transparency as body ideal. In
our discussion of Weiss we encountered two
examples: the ideal of health frustrates living
bodies that cannot achieve this and it negates
bodily experiences like pregnancy, lactation and
dressing up, all of which can be enjoyable. In the
last section, we considered a third example: trans-
parency as ideal misses out on what it takes to
achieve it. Finally, body technologies may change
when and how we die, but not that we die, while
they also constitute new illnesses. Moreover, these
aspects of embodiment, illness and dying may be
negatively affected by ideals of health. It is clear
that the improvement in embodiment and the
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coincide.
We have three suggestions for integrating the
use of body technologies – in order to improve
embodiment – with striving for lived intergrity.
First, on the level of TE: engineers, physicians and
others involved in or discussing TE can make clear
that it does not teach us what bodies are, but is one
more body technology that may help people to
improve embodiment or to ﬁnd a new balance. By
emphasising engineering, work, patient involve-
ment and so on, TE and the embodiment consti-
tuted by it may be understood as an achievement.
Hence, this also means engaging in discussion
concerning engineering ﬂesh and designing bodies,
as the short-cut to present TE as natural should be
avoided. Second, on a political or ethical level we
may discuss other aspects of caring for the body
rather than merely trying to regain physiological
health. Lived health is already a broader objective,
as it does not presume one correct balance.
Furthermore, lived health can also be constituted
by changing surroundings, with the aid of tech-
nologies and by ﬁnding new meanings. We argued
that lived integrity is an important aspect of good
embodied life, and thus should be an additional
objective of health care. But are there ways to
stimulate it without idealising one aspect of lived
multiplicity? Thirdly, for reﬂexive work on new
medical technologies the challenge is to integrate
both aspects of body making in the analysis: the
improvement of bodies and the aﬀects of body
ideals/ interpretations of what bodies are. A
phenomenological account of bodies as used here
is rich in this respect. It captures how we exist
materially and how material changes aﬀect us. In
addition, it opens other aspects of situatedness:
lived intercorporeality is material, social, political
and ethical.
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Notes
1. Eugene Thacker discusses TE as part of regenerative
medicine, pointing out that regenerative medicine
might lead us to think of the body as either fully stable
or to be changed at will (Thacker, 2002).
2. Embodiment is one of four body-technology relations
that Ihde describes. The others are hermeneutic
relations (i.e. medical imaging), altery relations (i.e.
robot as quasi-other) and technology as a background
(i.e. central heating) (Ihde, 1990, pp. 96–98).
3. Example taken from Svenaeus (2001) and amended.
4. For Varela and Nancy, the cultural-historical aspects of
embodiment are a central part of their experience. Ihde
recognises cultural eﬀects, but tends to diﬀerentiate
between the body as described by Merleau-Ponty and
the cultural body (Ihde, 2002, pp. 16–34).
5. Transparency here refers to automatic balancing and
not total transparency in the sense that body is in the
background all the time.
6. Even if someones experience of illness is constituted
on the basis societal norms, their experience is still rel-
evant (Stoller, 2006).
7. Tissue engineers assume that the tissue will remodel in
the body: i.e. adapt its structures to withstand the
pressures in the body.
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